Data · Physical Chain Pillar
Geographic concentration of capacity, by material and processing stage
The data show the estimated share of leading countries in global production or capacity. The stage selected varies according to source availability: extraction, refining, purification, or crystal manufacturing.
Nine material-stage pairs are shown. They correspond to the cases for which a sufficiently documented, quantified geographic breakdown could be established. The percentages should be read as orders of magnitude. Some correspond to published ranges or combined shares, rather than official statistics accurate to the last digit.
Gallium (refining)
China, 98 to 99% of global primary supplyCanada, Japan, Slovakia, United States, marginal
Indium (refining)
China 65%
South Korea, Canada, Japan
China, 60 to 71% of refined productionSouth Korea, Canada, Japan
Niobium (mining extraction)
Brazil, approximately 93% of estimated global mining production in 2025 (with CBMM alone accounting for more than three quarters of the global market, from its Araxá complex)Rest of the world, approximately 7%
Heavy rare earths / ytterbium (high-purity refining)
China, at least 90% of refiningRest of the world, less than 10%
Tantalum (extraction)
DRC + Rwanda 60%
Others 40%
DRC and Rwanda, approximately 60%Brazil, Australia, others, approximately 40%
Strontium (extraction)
China 45%
Spain 27%
Iran 26%
China, approximately 45%Spain, approximately 27%Iran, approximately 26%Others, approximately 2%
Lithium niobate (high-quality crystal boules)
China 65%
Japan + others 35%
China (CASTECH), 60 to 70%Japan (Sumitomo) and others
Rubidium, raw extraction
United States 48%
Canada 19%
Russia 16%
Others 17%
United States, 48.1%Canada, 18.9%Russia, 15.9%Australia, Namibia, China (primary extraction), others, approximately 17%
Rubidium, refining to ultra-high purity (quantum grade)
China, more than 70% of high-purity refiningRest of the world, less than 30%
Strategic reading. China holds a dominant or significant position in several of the chains presented, notably for refined gallium, refined indium, heavy rare earths, lithium niobate, ultra-high-purity rubidium, and strontium.
This industrial concentration should be considered alongside the priority given to quantum computing in China's 14th Five-Year Plan for the 2021-2025 period. This connection does not demonstrate that each of these capacities was developed specifically for quantum applications. It nevertheless highlights a strategic convergence between control of upstream resources and processes, on one hand, and the technological ambition Beijing has stated, on the other.
China's position therefore does not rest solely on its research programs and quantum infrastructure. It also benefits from an industrial base present across several of the links required to develop these technologies.
Reading the chart. A consistent color is assigned to each country so that its appearances across several value chains are immediately visible. China and Russia thus appear in several categories, but at different industrial stages.
Five materials from the panel of thirteen do not yet have a sufficiently precise geographic breakdown to be shown separately: helium-3, whose flows are tied to sovereign programs and a commercial market with little transparency; germanium-70, whose Russian share is documented only at the aggregated level of stable isotopes and cannot be isolated without overstating the precision of the source; silicon-28, whose isotopic production is not yet subject to a sufficiently robust public breakdown; synthetic diamond of electronic quality, for which no reliable global breakdown has been identified; and very high-purity aluminum, for which no consistent country-by-country statistic has been identified.
The documented Russia-China partnership on stable isotopes (approximately 40% of the global market for Russia via Rosatom/TVEL, with a portion of exports redirected toward China since April 2026) illustrates a dependency and strategic access rather than a quantifiable Chinese share of production: the source does not allow this figure to be attributed separately to germanium-70, silicon-28, or helium-3, which is why these three materials are not shown as a single bar in the chart.
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